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Abstract
The use of several distinct recovery procedures is one of the
techniques that can be used to ensure high availability and
fault-tolerance of computer systems. This method has been
applied to telecommunications systems and usually uses re-
dundant hardware and special recovery software to restore
the system after hardware and software failures. We pro-
pose a simple practical analytical approach to availabil-
ity evaluation of systems with several recovery procedures
based on a new ‘segregated failures’ model. To illustrate
this method, it is applied to availability evaluation of a Lu-
cent Technologies Reliable Clustered Computing applica-
tion. Detailed numerical results are provided and the im-
pact of various types of failures and coverage factors on
down time is analysed.
Keywords: software, fault-tolerance, availability, reliabil-
ity, recovery, fault model.
1 Introduction
When a computer system fails, a variety of recovery pro-
cedures are available. Some are fast, but apply only to a
limited class of failures. Others are slow but will restore
service in more cases. All of these methods use redundant
hardware and special recovery software.
The main aim of using several recovery procedures is to
reduce restoration (recovery)1 time. A recovery strategy im-
plies applying recovery procedures in a specific order until
a successful recovery occurs. In other words, a recovery
1In this paper, we use terms restoration and recovery as synonyms.
strategy is divided into several levels where one recovery
procedure is assigned to each level. When a failure has oc-
curred, a procedure with the shortest recovery time is usu-
ally applied first (level 1), for example, switching to a wait-
ing redundant computer (hot spare). If the first recovery
attempt is not successful, level 2 procedure is applied, for
example, a computer restart, and so on. The highest level
procedure always guarantees a recovery by a full repair or
replacement.
The recovery procedures at the initial levels are usually
automatic. The last procedure tried is usually a manual re-
pair. In this paper, we consider the situation when the order
of procedures is fixed without examination of the cause of
the failure. In other words, we assume that the procedures
do not use the information from an examination to decide
which procedure to try first. The one exception is for spe-
cific hardware failures when it can be diagnosed that the
further use of automatic recovery is not expedient. In this
case, the intermediate levels can be skipped and the highest
level procedure (the manual repair) is applied.
An example of a practical use of several recovery levels
is the Lucent Technologies Reliable Clustered Computing
(RCC) product [2]. RCC methodology provides an imple-
mentation of various fault-tolerance recovery strategies to
achieve high availability of commercial non-fault tolerant
systems.
For availability evaluation of such systems, Markov
chains [3, 4, 5, 7], Matrix-Geometric solutions [1], and
Petri nets [6] have been used. These approaches are pow-
erful mathematical methods. However, analysis using these
methods can be quite complicated and often requires spe-
cial software tools. When such tools are used, calculations
that require careful scrutiny are hidden from users. Both
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the models and the algorithms inside the tools are often
based on implicit assumptions; if these assumptions are not
valid for the actual application, the results are of doubtful
value. In this paper, we propose a new ‘segregated fail-
ures’ model and a simple practical analytical approach to
availability. The hardware/software failures are divided into
several types and availability of the system is calculated
separately for each type of failures. This makes calcula-
tions more understandable for users and allows determining
the impact of each type of failures on the availability of the
whole system.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
section 2, we consider the ‘segregated failures’ model of
a system with several recovery procedures. Section 3 de-
scribes our approach and presents simple mathematical for-
mulas that allow us to calculate the availability of the hard-
ware/software system. In section 4, an example of the appli-
cation of the proposed approach, the Lucent Technologies
RCC product, is considered. Availability of this application
was analysed in [5] using a Markov chain model. In this
paper, we apply our analytical approach to the same appli-
cations using the same input data. Detailed results of the
numerical availability evaluation are provided and the im-
pact of (1) various types of failures and (2) coverage factors
on the system down time is analysed. General conclusions
are presented in Section 5.
2 Segregated failures model of a system with
several recovery procedures
2.1 Comparison with a traditional system with
one recovery procedure
The difference between a traditional system with one re-
covery procedure and a system with several recovery pro-
cedures is illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume that the system
can be in only two states: a normal (working) state NS
and a failed state FS. A transition from the normal state to
the failed state is described by failure rate λ. For the tradi-
tional system (Fig. 1a), an inverse transition from the failed
state to the working state is described by restoration rate µ
or, correspondingly, mean restoration time τ = 1/µ. It is
assumed that only one recovery procedure exists and that a
result of recovery is always successful. In that way, the term
restoration refers to the process of restoration as well as its
result.
For the system in Fig. 1b, n (n > 1) different recovery
procedures exist. For every procedure from 1 to n − 1, the
result of the recovery can be either successful or unsuccess-
ful. When a failure occurs, usually recovery procedures are
applied sequentially starting from level 1. If the recovery
procedure at level 1 is unsuccessful, the level 2 procedure is
applied, i.e. the failure is escalated from level 1 to level 2,
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Figure 1. System with one recovery level (a)
and with several recovery levels (b).
etc. It is assumed that a result of level n recovery is always
successful.
Similarly to a traditional system, every recovery level i
is described by restoration rate µi or mean restoration time
τi = 1/µi. However, the sense of these indexes is slightly
different here. Because a restoration procedure can be un-
successful, the term restoration refers here only to the pro-
cess of restoration, not to its result (successful or unsuccess-
ful).
2.2 Segregated failures model
Let F be the complete set of failures of the system. One
can consider this set as a hypothetical set of all failures in
past, present and future. Another view is to consider the
set of all failures in the past for a long period of time. The
difference in understanding is not very important because
the set F is used further only for introducing different types
of faults.
As it was mentioned, the result of recovery can be either
successful or unsuccessful. We say that a failure is served at
level i if the level i procedure is applied (with two possible
results) to this failure. This means that recovery at previous
levels has been unsuccessful. Let Fi be a set of failures that
are served at level i, Fi ⊆ F . Consider now only failures,
for which the result of recovery at level i is successful.
Definition 1 A failure f is said to be a failure of type i if
and only if i is the lowest level where this failure is success-
fully recovered.
Denote a set of such failures as Ftypei . It follows from
Definition 1 thatFtypei ⊆ Fi and a set ofFtypei partitions
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F , i.e.
F =
n⋃
i=1
Ftypei (1)
and
∀i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Ftypei ∩ Ftypej = ∅ (2)
The ability of the recovery procedure to successfully
restore a failure is often described by a coveragefactor.
Adapting it for our model, consider the following defini-
tion:
Definition 2 A coverage factor prec,i of the recovery level
i is a conditional probability that a failure is successfully
recovered at level i given that this failure is served at level
i.
More formally,
prec,i = P(f ∈ Ftypei | f ∈ Fi) (3)
We mentioned above that usually failures are escalated
sequentially, from level i to level i + 1. We assume that
the recovery procedure is independent of the nature of the
failure and is applied to all hardware and software failures.
However, if at any level it is diagnosed for a specific failure
that the usage of next recovery levels is not expedient, these
levels can be skipped and this failure can be escalated di-
rectly to the last level n. Thus, there are three possibilities2
when a failure is served at level i, 1 ≤ i < n:
• The failure is successfully recovered.
• The failure is escalated to the next level i + 1.
• The failure is not escalated to the next level and is di-
rectly escalated to the last level n.
According to Definition 2, the probability of the first
possibility is prec,i. Probability pnext,i of second and plast,i
of the third possibilities are determined as following:
pnext,i = P(f ∈ Fi+1 | f ∈ Fi) (4)
plast,i = P(f ∈ Fn ∧ ¬f ∈ Fi+1 | f ∈ Fi) (5)
Probability prec,i is defined for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, probabilities
pnext,i and plast,i - only for 1 ≤ i < n. For consistency,
we additionally determine that pnext,n = plast,n = 0. It
follows from the definitions that prec,n = 1, plast,n−1 = 0
and prec,i + pnext,i + plast,i = 1.
2The model can be easily extended to consider skipping some levels
but not all of them. We do not address it in this paper.
Some failures can be escalated to the last level even be-
fore applying the procedure of level 1. For consistency with
previously introduced notation, let us denote the probability
of this event as plast,0. Accordingly, we denote the prob-
ability that the procedure of level 1 is applied as pnext,0,
pnext,0 = 1− plast,0.
The described division of failures into the types and the
main parameters of the model are shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. Classifying failures into the types.
To summarize the model, every level i is de-
fined as 4-tuple (µi, prec,i, pnext,i, plast,i). In
turn, the whole system is defined as (n + 2)-tuple
(λ, pnext,0, (µi, prec,i, pnext,i, plast,i)ni=1).
3 Approach to availability evaluation
The main idea of the proposed approach is classifying
processor failures into several types in concordance with the
described model and evaluating the influence of each type
of failure on the availability of the whole system. More
detailed, the approach contains the following six main steps:
• Step 1: separating all failures into different types cor-
responding to the lowest recovery level where faults
are successfully recovered as it is considered in Sec-
tion 2.
• Step 2: for the each type k, evaluating probability
ptypek that a failure belongs type k, i.e., ptypek =
P(f ∈ Ftypek) . For type 1,
ptype1 = prec,1 × pnext,0 (6)
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For types k, 1 < k < n, the probability is evaluated as
ptypek = prec,k ×
k−1∏
i=1
pnext,i × pnext,0 (7)
For type n,
ptypen = (plast,1 +
n−2∑
j=2
(plast,j ×
j−1∏
i=1
pnext,i)+
+
n−1∏
i=1
pnext,i)× pnext,0 + plast,0 (8)
It is possible to prove the equality
n∑
k=1
ptypek = 1 (9)
that also follows immediately from classifying failures
into mutual exclusive types.
• Step 3: evaluating the failure rate λtypek for failures of
the each type k:
λtypek = λ× ptypek (10)
where ptypek are deternined by (6), (7), and (8) .
From (9) it follows that
λ =
n∑
k=1
λtypek (11)
• Step 4: evaluating the restoration rate µtypek for fail-
ures of the each type k. For failures of type k, the
mean restoration time τtypek should include mean ser-
vice time τk at level k and also include time which has
been unsuccessfully spent for recovery at the previous
levels:
τtypek =
k∑
i=1
τi (12)
Since the mean restoration time τtypek = 1/µtypek ,
the restoration rate is:
µtypek =
1
∑k
i=1
1
µi
(13)
where µi is restoration (service) rate for the recovery
procedure at level i.
• Step 5: evaluating the availability. As the measure of
availability calculate the expected down time Tdk dur-
ing a fixed period of time T relative to failures of type
k:
Tdk(T ) = T (1−Ak) = T λk
λk + µtypek
(14)
where Ak = µtypek/(λk+µtypek) - availability factor.
The down time can be measured in minutes per year.
In that case T = 365× 24× 60 = 525600 minutes.
Usually λk  µtypek . Then, instead of formula (14),
it is possible to use the approximate value of the down
time per year:
Tdk = λkτtypek (15)
calculating λk in ‘failures per year’and τtypek in min-
utes.
• Step 6: evaluating the down time of the system based
on results of the previous step. To calculate the total
down time, just sum up the down time for every type
of failure:
Td =
n∑
k=1
Tdk (16)
It is necessary to mention that even when the exact for-
mula (14) is used, formula (16) can give an approximate
result. Because failures of different types are considered
separately, we take into account the situation when a failure
of one type can occur during recovery after a failure of an-
other type. If the real situation or an assumption of a model
is opposite (i.e., the system never fails during recovery) then
our approach of availability evaluation gives a slightly pes-
simistic result. However, because in practice τtypek  T
(see the example in Section 4), the difference between ap-
proximate and exact results is not essential.
4 Example: Reliable Clustered Computing
4.1 Cluster failure model
As an example of the application of the proposed ap-
proach, consider the Lucent Technologies Reliable Clus-
tered Computing (RCC) product [2], which has been anal-
ysed in [5] using a Markov chain model.
The goal of RCC is to achieve high levels of availabil-
ity and reliability using commercial off-the-shelf computers
in a cost-effective manner. A system using RCC is a col-
lection of processors connected by standard interconnects
such as an Ethernet bus. In this paper we consider an exam-
ple with one active and one spare (standby) node but gener-
ally RCC supports various architectures with several active
and/or spare nodes.
RCC includes two hardware devices (PowerDog and
WatchDog) and software components. The PowerDog can
turn electrical power on/off for a single processor. The
WatchDog monitors the state of hardware (processors) and
forces a recovery if necessary. Software components of
RCC monitor the state and manage recovery procedures of
individual software applications. RCC detects and recov-
ers failures at several levels. A specific recovery strategy
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varies for different RCC applications. In this example we
base on [5] and model the following sequence of recovery
procedures:
• A switchover from a failed active node to a spare node.
• An automatic processor restart.
• An automatic processor restart after data reload from
disk.
• A manual processor repair.
A diagrammatic representation of the RCC failure model is
shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3. Cluster failure model.
Model inputs are the following (taking the notation and
inputs values from [5] for consistency):
• λ - processor failure rate, represent all hardware and
software failures for a single processor.
• µs, µp, µg - recovery rates, correspondingly, after
switchover, processor restart, and processor restart
with data reload.
• µR - processor manual repair rate.
• (1 − ca) - proportion of processor failures impact all
processors.
• c1, c2, c3 - coverage factors, i.e. proportions of proces-
sor recoveries, correspondingly, after switchover, pro-
cessor restart, and restart with data reload.
The values of input data are the following [5]:
λ = 8 failures per year
µs = 30 recoveries per hour
µp = 12 recoveries per hour
µg = 2 recoveries per hour
µR = 0.25 repair per hour
ca = 0.99
c1, c2, c3 = 0.9, 0.75
4.2 Availability evaluation of RCC system
Step 1: According to our approach, we consider the fol-
lowing four types of failures:
• Type 1: failures recovered by switchover.
• Type 2: failures recovered by processor restart.
• Type 3: failures recovered by restart with reload.
• Type 4: failures recovered by processor repair .
Step 2 - 3: Using (10) - (12) and (14) for failures of types
1 - 4 gives the following equations for failure rates λtypei :
λtype1 = λc1ca (17)
λtype2 = λc2(1− c1)ca (18)
λtype3 = λc3(1− c1)(1− c2)ca (19)
λtype4 = λ((1− c1)(1− c2)(1− c3)ca + 1− ca) (20)
Step 4: Using (16) gives the following values of the
restoration times:
τtype1 = 1/µs = 1/30 hour = 2 min
τtype2 = τtype1 + 1/µp = 2 min + 5 min = 7 min
τtype3 = τtype2 + 1/µg = 7 min + 30 min = 37 min
τtype4 = τtype3 + 1/µR = 37 min + 240 min = 277 min
Step 5 - 6: The intermediate results and values Tdi and
Td of the down time according (19) - (20) are presented in
Table 1.
Clearly system availability is strongly affected by the
values of the coverage factors. This is illustrated in table 1,
where increasing the coverage factor from .75 to .9 reduces
the system down time from 92 to 46 minutes per year.
Values of coverage factors reflect the nature of system
failures. Unfortunately, often there are no easy ways to
increase these values. Therefore it is important to pay at-
tention to another index, namely the mean restoration time,
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Type of Failure rate and ci = 0.9 ci = 0.75
failures down time
1 λtype1 7.13 5.94
Td1 14.3 11.9
2 λtype2 0.71 1.49
Td2 5.0 10.4
3 λtype3 0.07 0.37
Td3 2.6 13.7
4 λtype4 0.09 0.20
Td4 24.4 56.4
System down time Td 46 92
Table 1. Failure rates (per year) and expected
down time (minutes per year).
which is also important for availability. It follows from Ta-
ble 1 that the largest contribution into the system down time
is made by the down time after the manual processor re-
pairs: 24.4 min from total 46 min (53 %) for ci = 0.9 and
56.4 min from total 92 min (61 %) for ci = 0.75. The
less values of coverage factor, the more the influence of the
down time after the manual repairs.
In contrast to values of coverage factors, the value of the
mean restoration time can be reduced with the help of cer-
tain technical-organizational actions, such using special di-
agnostic equipment, improvement of the provision of hard-
ware spares, etc. If the repair time is reduced from 4 hours
to 3 hours, than the expected down time after repairs be-
comes equal 19.5 min (decreasing 20 % ) and the total sys-
tem down time becomes 41 min (decreasing 11 % ). If the
repair time is reduced from 4 hours to 2 hours, than the
expected down time after repairs becomes equal 14.1 min
(decreasing 42 % ) and the total system down time becomes
36 min (decreasing 22 % ).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider an availability assessment of
a specific type of fault-tolerant hardware/software systems,
namely systems with several recovery procedures. Such
systems are widely used in the telecommunications area
where a very high level of availability is required.
Previous research in this area used powerful mathemat-
ical methods (mainly, Markov chains approach), which are
at the same time quite complicated and usually require the
use of software tools. As supplementary approach, we sug-
gest a simple analytical method to availability evaluation
based on a new segregated failures model. This approach
allows manually assessing availability of a system as well as
an impact of each recovery procedure on the system avail-
ability.
The approach also allows finding weakest links of a sys-
tem reliability architecture and recovery strategy. As a re-
sult, one can determine the level where techniques of avail-
ability improvement (increasing coverage factors, decreas-
ing recovery time, etc.) can be applied to a specific system
in the most effective way.
6 Acknowledgement
This work was supported by Science Foundation Ireland
under SFI Grants 01/P1.2/C009 and 03/CE3/1405.
References
[1] Hoeflin, D.A., Mendiratta, V.B. Elementary Model for
Predicting Switching System Outage Durations. Pro-
ceedings of XV International Switching Symposium,
Berlin, Germany, 23–28 April, 1995.
[2] Hughes-Fenchel, G. A flexible clustered approach to
high availability. Digest of Papers of Twenty-Seventh
Annual International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant
Computing, FTCS-27, Seattle, Washington, USA, 24–
27 June 1997, pp. 314–318.
[3] Ibe O., Howe, R., Trivedi, K. S. Approximate Avail-
ability Analysis of VAXCluster Systems. IEEE Trans-
actions on Reliability, Vol. 38, No. 1, April 1989, pp.
146–152.
[4] Lyu, M.R., Mendiratta, V.B. Software fault tolerance
in a clustered architecture: techniques and reliability
modeling. Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Aerospace
Conference, Volume 5, Snowmass, CO, USA, 6–13
March 1999, pp. 141–150.
[5] Mendiratta, V.B. Reliability analysis of clustered com-
puting systems. Proceedings of the Ninth Interna-
tional Symposium on Software Reliability Engineer-
ing, Paderborn, Germany, 4–7 November 1998, pp.
268–272.
[6] Sun, H., Han, J.J., Levendel, H. A generic availability
model for clustered computing systems. Proceedings
of 2001 Pacific Rim International Symposium on De-
pendable Computing, Seoul, Korea, 17–19 December
2001, pp. 241–248.
[7] Sun, H., Han, J.J., Levendel, H. Availability re-
quirement for a fault-management server in high-
availability communication systems. IEEE Transac-
tions on Reliability, Volume 52, Issue 2, June 2003,
pp. 238–244.
Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC’05) 
0730-3157/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE 
